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IN THE SUPRE.ME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

ALBERT A. CECIL,
Plaintiff and 1-lespondcnt,

vs.
LA\~l~~RA

C. CECIL, ELIZA ·C. BUTTERFIELD, as Guardian of the person of La \T era C. Cecil, and WALK}~R B..:~XI~ & TRUST COMPANY,
a corporation, as Guardian of the
Estate of LaVera C. Cecil, an Incompetent,

·Case No. 9229

Defendants and Appellants.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal from a judgment entered in favor
of the plaintiff and against the defendants modifying
the decree of divorce and thereby relieving plaintiff from
any obligation to pay alimony to defendant Walker Bank
& Trust Company as guardian of the estate of LaVera
C. Cecil, an incompetent (R. 104), and awarding to
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plaintiff judgment in the amount of $340.00 together
\vith costs incurred (R. 105).
LaVera C. Cecil and Albert A. Cecil were married
~iay 4, 1935. On June 22, 1953, the plaintiff, Albert A.
Cecil, commenced an action for divorce against LaVera
C. Cecil (R. 1). An answer and counterclaim in said
matter \Vas filed on July 11, 1953 (R. 3) and the defendant LaVera C. ·C·ecil was, during the pendency of said
action and on the 23rd day of October, 1953, adjudged an
incompetent (R. 9). Guardianship proceedings, the appointment of Eliza C. Butterfield, mother of LaVera C.
Cecil, as guardian of the person, and Walker Bank &
Trust Company as guardian of the estate of LaVera C.
Cecil were \Yith the consent and approval of plaintiff,
and as a direct result of said appointments the plaintiff
amended his complaint alleging LaVera C. ·Cecil to be
an incompetent.
During the pendency of the divorce action, and prior
to the guardianship proceedings, a stipulation and agreement was entered into providing for the payment of
alimony, distribution of property and custody of the
minor child (R. 11-12).

The stipulation and agree-

ment was approved by the Probate Court on the 30th
day of October, 1953 (Probate File 36053). On the 3rd
day of November, 1953, the plaintiff \Yas awarded a
decree of divorce, which decree incorporated the provisions of the stipulation and awarded to the estate of
LaVera C. Cecil, one-half of the net value of the ho1ne
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and furni~hing~; of the partic)s and the surn of $85.00 per
1nonth as ali1nony for the said La\; era C. (~ecil (R. 16-18).
A purported marriage was entered into on the 6th
day of January, 1959, bet-vveen La\. . era C. Cecil, an incolnpetent, and Dar-vvin ·C. Richardson at Elko, Nevada,
as indicated by a marriage certificate, Exhibit 1 P. Said
1narriage was without the knowledge and consent of the
guardians of the estate and person of the said LaVera
C. Cecil (R. 57, 70). During the marriage LaVera C.
Cecil and Darwin ·C. Richardson lived together but a
short ti1ne, during which time they continually fought
and \Yere thrown out of the hotel (R. 58-59). LaVera C.
Crcil, an incompetent, by her guardian, Eliza C. Butterfield, filed in the District ·Court of the Third Judicial
District, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, a
eon1plaint against Darwin C. Richardson, wherein it was
prayed that the purported marriage be dissolved and
annulled (Court File 121299).
The appearance and
\vaiver of Darwin ·C. Richardson was signed on the 9th
day of June, 1959, and the matter was heard before the
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson on the 12th day of June,
1959, resulting in a decree declaring the marriage contract to be null and void and of no force and effect
(Court File 121299). The Court, in its Findings of Fact,
found in the annulment proceedings as follows:
"1. That the plaintiff is now and for several
years last past has been a resident of Salt Lake
County, State of Utah.
"2. That on the 23rd day of October, 1953,
the above entitled court entered its order appointSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ing Eliza C. Butterfield as guardian of the person, and Walker Bank & Trust ·Company as guardian of the estate of the above named LaVera C.
Cecil, an Incompetent; that said Eliza C. Butterfield is now and at all times herein mentioned has
been the duly appointed, qualified and acting
guardian of the person of LaVera ·C. Cecil.
"3. That on the 3rd day of N" ovember, 1953
the above entitled court in Case No. 98922, vvherein
Albert A. Cecil was plaintiff and Eliza C. Butterfield, as guardian of the person, and Walker Bank
& Trust ·Company, a corporation, as guardian of
the estate of LaVera C. Cecil, an Incompetent,
were defendants, entered its Decree of Divorce,
which said decree has never been set aside or
modified.
"4. That on the 6th day of January, 1959 the
above named LaVera C. Cecil was allegedly married to the defendant, Dar\Yin ·C. Richardson, at
Salt Lake City, Utah; that at the time of entering
into said 1narriage contract the plaintiff ,.~las an
incompetent and incapable of entering into said
contract; that after said purp-orted 1narriage the
parties only lived together a short time and at
the present time are living separate and apart.''
(Court File 121299).
The instant action by plaintiff \Yas commenced by
filing a petition for modification of decree on the lOth
day of July, 1959, \vhich petition sought the ter1nination
of plaintiff's obligation to pay alimony as of January 6,
1959, and judgment against defendant Walker Bank &
Trust Company as guardian of the estate of LaVera c·.
Cecil for the sum of $510.00 paid by plaintiff to defendant Walker Bank & Trust Company for the use and
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benefit of the said La\.,.era C. Cecil s1nee January 6,
19;)~) (R. 19-20). An answer to the petition (R. 23-25)
and a reply (R. 29-30) to the answer were filed raising
the is~ues and leaving for determination by the court the
effect of the guardianship proceedings and the annulInent of the Inarriage betvveen ·Cecil and Richardson upon
plaintiff's obligation to pay alimony.

'T

La era C. Cecil was examined by Dr. Louis ~Ioench,
a psychiatrist, on the 9th day of September, 1959, at the
request of plaintiff's attorney pursuant to agreement of
eounsel (R. 46). The Doctor's examination consisted of
a psychiatric history and a mental status examination
based on her medical history of previous illnesses, her
1ne1nory, her reasoning ability to handle proverbs, and
an exa1nination of her record in the State Hospital. The
Doctor's diagnostic opinion was that LaVera C. Cecil
'"'as suffering from paranoid schizophrenic reaction (R.
47). \Vhen asked on direct examination for an opinion
as to her mental competency to enter into a marriage
relationship on January 6, 1959, the Doctor stated as
follovvs:
"~Iy opinion was that from the evidence that
I had that she was probably not competent to
enter into a marriage at that time." (R. 48).

On cross examination the Doctor stated that he thought
La,. . era C. Cecil was aware that she was getting married and that, vvhile she understood she was being married, she probably was not mentally capable of following
through \Yith all of her responsibilities in the marriag-e
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(R. 50-51). Stated another way, the Doctor felt that
LaVera C. Cecil was not competent to marry as she did
not understand the many responsibilties and requirements of a marriage contract. Eliza ·C. Butterfield, her
mother, Edward G. Richards, Trust Officer of Walker
Bank & Trust Coinpany, and Edward F. Richards,
attorney for defendants herein, all of whom have had
an opportunity to come in close contact with LaVera C.
Cecil, were of the opinion that she was unable to handle
her own affairs, understand the full purport of her
actions and carry on marital relations during the period
involved (R. 58, 67, 80).
LaVera ·C. Cecil appeared in person before the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson at the time of the hearing on
the annulment and the Court had the opportunity of
observing her mental condition. At the time of trial in
the instant matter the Court was advised that LaVera
C. ·Cecil was notified of the hearing and that her presence
was requested, but she refused to attend. Counsel for
defendants said he had no objection to an order of court
being issued for her presence and would cooperate in
every way to have her in court. N ot,vithstanding the
court did not require her presence (R. 41, 57).
The estate of LaVera C. Cecil, an incompetent, at
the time of trial in the instant matter consisted of $471.52
cash and $2000.00 in United States Treasury 4%% bonds
due November 15, 1960, and said estate is being depleted
in excess of $85.00 per month (R. 66, 74).
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ST_l-\TEI\fENT OF POINTS RELIED ON
I. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CO·URT DECLARING
THE l\IARRIAGE NULL AND VOID IS BINDING ON THE
WORLD AND CANNOT BE COLLATERALLY ATTACKED.
II. THE FINDING THAT LAVER.A C. CECIL WAS
COMPE'TENT TO MARR.Y IS CONTRARY TO THE WEIGHT
OF THE EVIDENCE AND LAW.
III. THE COURT ERRED IN TERMINATING ALIMONY REGARDLESS O·F THE VALIDITY O•F THE MARRIAGE ON JANUARY 6, 1960.
IV. THE JUDGMENT OF MODIFICA1TION, FINDINGS
AND CO'NCLUSIONS IN SUPPOR.T THEREO:F ARE CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE AND THE LAW.

AR.GUMENT
I. THE JUDGTh1ENT OF THE COURT DECLARING
THE l\1ARRIAGE NULL AND VOID IS BINDING ON THE
\VORLD AND CANNOT BE COLLATERALLY ATTACKED.

At the time of the hearing in the instant matter
La'?era ·C. Cecil was not married nor had she been
1narried from the time of the original decree of divorce,
the purported marriage between her and Richardson
having been judicially declared null and void. The primary purpose of the annulment proceedings V\ras to determine and fix the status of LaVera C. 'Cecil, and the
judgment fixing her status, being a judgment in rem,
is conclusive and binding on the world. In subsequent
actions, including the instant matter, the annulment proceedings cannot be collaterally attacked.
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The binding effect of an adjudication, the primary
purpose of \vhich is to determine the status of individuals, is well stated in the case of HiJlton v. Snyder (1910),
37. Utah 384, 108 P. 698, wherein the Court stated:
"As we understand the rule which distinguishes
a status from any other element in a case, it is
this : If an action, although prosecuted by one
individual against another, is instituted for the
sole purpose of changing or declaring the status
of either one or both of the parties to the action,
then, in the absence of fraud or collusion in obtaining the judgment, it is binding upon all the
'vorld as \Vell as the parties and their privies."
This rule is supported by the case of !leaden v. Pope &
Talbot, Inc. (3 C.C. 1958'), 252 F. 2d 739, wherein it is
stated:
"It IS our v1evv that the proceeding in South
Carolina \\-as an ·adjudication the prilnary purpose of \Yhich was to declare the status of individuals, and to that extent it possessed characteristics of a proceeding in rem. 2 Freeman on
Judgments, Sec. 900 (1925); 31 Aln. Jur., JndgInents Sec. 441 (1940); 35 Am. Jur., Marriage
Sec. 235 (1941) ~ In re Holben's Estate, 1930,
300 Pa. 169, 150 A. 604, 605. Being a decree
in ren1, its adjudication of the validity of Benton's second marriage was conclusive on the
\vorld, even in subsequent actions on different
subject matters. Restaten1ent. Judgments See. 74
(1942); 2 Free1nan on Judgments Sec. 900
(1925)."
A general state1nent of the law is found is 30A
A1n. Jur., Judgments, Section 135, page 248, as follows:
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.. J udgrnents in rein are

l'(~garded

as conclusive
hy the courts. Indeed, the rule limiting the conclusiveness of a judgn1ent to the parties to the
proceeding in which it "\vas rendered, and their
privies, has been declared subject to an exception
in the case of a judgment in rem, which, the court
having jurisdiction, is binding on third per~~on~,
or on all parties in interest, or, as it is frequently
said, on the vvhole world. * * *"

See also In re Marrow's Estate (1937, Colo.), 68 P. 2d 36.
The only "\vay to disturb the annuhnent proceeding
1s by direct attack, which was not done in this case.
vVhile the plaintiff's pleadings challenge the annulment
decree on the basis of false misrepresentation, there is
no evidence in the record that said decree was procured
through fraud or otherwise. In fact the court made a
specific finding that the marriage between Cecil and
Richardson had been annulled, which finding, together
",.ith others, clearly set forth that the decree of annuln1ent
stands as entered.
The case of Hilton v. Snyder, supra, expressed the
Yie"\v that in nearly all, if not all jurisdictions, special
proceedings are provided by which the status of certain
individuals may be determined and established when for
special reasons it becomes necessary to do so.
Title 30-1-17, Ut,ah Code Annotated 1953 provides
that when doubt is felt as to the validity of a marriage
either party may, in a court of equity, demand its avoidance or affirmance.
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The only necessary parties to the suit for annulment
''Tere LaVera C. Cecil, her guardian, and the defendant
Richardson. 1\tfrs. Cecil appeared personally and by her
guardian and the defendant Richardson appeared by
written 'vaiver and consent.
The effect of the annulment proceedings was to
destroy the marriage relationship ab initio and places
the parties, as to their property rights, in the same
position as though the annulled marriage had not taken
place.
II. THE FINDING THAT LAVERA C. CECIL WAS
COMPE TENT TO MARR.Y IS CONTRARY TO THE WEIGHT
OF THE EVIDENCE AND LAW.
1

We preface our argument under Point II by stating
that the annulment proceedings and its effect should require a reversal of the judgment for modification of
decree of divorce.
The prior adjudication of the insanity of La\Tera C.
Cecil is prima facie proof of unsoundness of mind at
the time she entered into the marriage contract 'vith
Dar,vin C. Richardson. 35 A11L Jur., ~farriage, Section
114, page 253; Hilton v. Snyder, supra.
In the Matter of the Estate and Guardianship of
LaVera C. Cecil, an Incompetent, Probate File 36053, it
is disclosed that La\Tera ·C. Cecil has never been declared competent and the. guardianship terminated. The
effect of the guardianship proceeding is well stated in
the case of Kuchnsted v. Turnwal, (Fla.) 155 So. 847,
as follows:
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'"It has also been held on good authority that
one adjudicated to be insane is presun1ed to
continue so until it is shown that sanitY has been
restored (cases cited)."
·
and in 29 A nl. J ~tr., Insane Persons, Section 67, page 191,
\Yhich states as follows:
"Transactions After Adjudication and _I\fter
Appointment of Guardian.-According to the n1ajority rule, the appointment of a guardian or
committee to control and manage the property
of a person following an adjudication that he
is incompetent because of insanity or habitual
drunkenness operates, within the jurisdiction at
any rate, to render contracts, other than purchase
of necessaries, made hy him during the existence
of such guardianship absolutely void. The same
rule applies to his conveyances and renders them
void, even as to subsequent purchasers. Moreover,
under some statutes, every contract by a lunatic,
after he is so found by a jury in a proceeding to
determine his competency, is void as against him
and his estate. The effect of an adjudication in
invalidating subsequent contracts and conveyances of an incompetent depends upon the extent
to which it divests him of the capacity to act in
his own behalf. The appointment of a guardian
of the property of an incompetent operates to
divest the latter of the power to contract or to
convey. His incapacity arises as a matter of
la,v, and does not depend upon an actual insanity
subsisting at the time of the act in question. It
exists when he is having a lucid interval and even
at a time \vhen he is sane, unless the guardianship
has been terminated by an order of court or has
been abandoned. An order of court approving the
contract, of one under guardianship, calling for
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
the surrender of his property does not validate
the contract unless the court has jurisdiction to
order a disposition of the ward's property in
proceedings properly brought before it for such
purpose. * * *"
While a person of unsound mind may pursue a purpose vvith the con1posure and regularity of a person of
sound mind, such conduct alone does not create the capacity to marry. In order to have the mental capacity
sufficient to contract a valid marriage the contracting
party must understand the nature of the contract and
the duties and responsibilities it creates.
Even though Doctor Th1oench testified that La\Tera
·C. Cecil knew she was marrying Darwin C. Richardson,
he nevertheless was of the opinion that she "\\:~as not con1petent to enter into the n1arriage at the tin1e of its consurnmation. In fact, on cross-examination~ the doctor
pointed out that in his opinion La\Tera C. Cecil did not
understand the many responsibilities and requirements
of a marriage contract. The doctor's opinion "\Y'"as shared
'vith those most closely connected "\Yith La\"T"era C. Cecil,
incompetent.
Reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to
the plaintiff, it clearly appears in view of the guardianship proceedings, the annulment proceedings, the testimony of Doctor Moench and all those most closely connected with LaVera C. Cecil that the finding of the court
to the effect that La\..era C. Cecil "\Yas competent to
marry on January 6, 1960 is not supported by the evidence.
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III. THE COURT ERRED IN TERMINATING ALIMONY REGARDLESS OF THE VALIDITY O·F THE MARRIAGE ON JANUARY 6, 1960.

A "·'ife does not automatically lose her right to alilnony upon remarriage.
Where there would be an
unconscionable or inequitable result such as would be
created in the instant matter, the court under its equitable powers should not terminate an award of alimony.
LaVera C. Cecil is an incompetent, having been
adjudicated as such on the 23rd day of October, 1953,
during the pendency of the divorce action and after
having been married to the plaintiff for a period of
approximately 18 years.
In the original divorce decree LaVera C. Cecil was
deprived of the custody of her minor child, was awarded
one-half of the value of the real property amounting to
$4613.95, together with the sum of $85.00 per month alimony. At the time of the hearing in the instant matter
there remained in her estate the sum of $2471.52, which
amotmt is being depleted at a rate in excess of $85.00
per month. T:o terminate the payment of alimony and
charge her estate with a judgment in the amount of
$340.00 would deplete her estate to a point where it
would not be long before LaVera C. ·Cecil would become
a charge of the State of Utah and dependent entirely
upon the Welfare Department for her care, supp·ort and
maintenance. Where conditions exist, as existed in this
case, the court, regardless of the validity or invalidity
of the marriage, should have continued the payment of
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alimony for LaVera C. Cecil's support and maintenance
in accordance with the views expressed in the case of
Ausbad v. Aust~ad, 2 Utah 2d 49, 269 P. 2d 284, wherein
it is stated as follows :
"In reaching this decision vve are not to be
understood as holding that the same result ·\\Tould
eventuate 'vhere a su1n of alimony was decreed
in lieu of dower, or in settlement of property
rights acquired by the wife, or where the alimony
is awarded in a lump sun1 payable in installments.
And we further observe that under some exceptional circumstances this result might be so unconscionable or inequitable that the court, under
its equitable powers would decree that the wife
does not lose her right to alimony upon remarriage. In such instance the burden would be
upon the wife to prove those facts."
Finding Number 6 to the effect that La\Tera C. Cecil
received a bargain in the original divorce proceedings
is unwarranted and not supported by the evidence. The
court in making this finding disregards the fact that
prior to and at the time of the original decree of divorce
she was mentally ill; that she entered the State Hospital
on May 2, 1952 and vvas not discharged until October,
1954. She was not responsible for her conduct toward
the plaintiff, and the award, nominal in nature, was an
app~roval

of the pToperty settlement agreement entered

into between the parties and their attorneys, which award
took into consideration the mental condition of La\7era
C. Cecil as i't existed then and as it exists at the present
time.
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IV. THE JUDGMENT OF MODIFICA'TION, FINDINGS
AND CONCLUSIONS IN SUPPORT THEREO:F ARE CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE AND THE LAW.

The judgment of modification, findings and conclusions in support thereof are contrary to law and the facts
in this case. The reasons for our position covering this
point have been pointed out in the argument covering
Points I, II and III.
CON·C·L US ION
In conclusion we respectfully submit that the annulInent proceeding is binding on the world and cannot be
challenged collaterally, nor can the marriage to Richardson be declared valid in this proceeding.
The court has erred in its finding and conclusion,
and in justice and equity the judgment for modification
of decree of divorce should be set aside and vacated and
plaintiff should be required to pay the money now due
and owing under the terms of the original decree, and
defendants should be awarded a reasonable attorneys'
fee for the defense of this action.
Respectfully submitted,
GUSTIN, RICHARDS & MATTSSON,
Attorneys for Defendants and
Appellants.
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